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Although it would be a stretch to consider FWJ Schelling a Lutheran, he shared 
some critical features of Luther’s critical engagement with Catholicism. This 
essay engages this mutual confrontation, and then discusses the new horizon, 
what Schelling dubs the Johanine Church, the church for everyone and eve-
rything, that is the latent promise of the Lutheran (and Pauline) confronta-
tion with the Petrine (or Catholic) Church. As such, this essay is an exercise 
in what Schelling called philosophical religion, a fruit of his late turn to posi-
tive philosophy.
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He made darkness his covering.
(Psalms 18:11)
1. Manifest Stupidity
Schelling and Luther? In his curious book, Schelling versus Hegel,1 John 
Laughland argues that Schelling died a sort of Catholic, having aban-
doned Hegel’s idealism for “the creation and nature of God’s action 
in reality” (SVH, 115). As Schelling aged, his resistance waned, and he be-
come increasingly religious. “To put it bluntly, in his old age Schelling 
got God” (SVH, 37). Indeed, according to this account, in his senescence 
he reverted to a kind of incipient Catholicism while Hegel, still under 
the spell of Luther, “brought to a head the Protestant insistence […] 
that ‘truth must be verified by my own insight’” (SVH, 143). Idealism had 
secured the noumenal ground of the Lutheran subject, but Schelling, 
through and through a  critic of  subjectivity, broke from it  to return 
to a pre-modern conception of revelation and hence it was a welcome 
irony that “a Catholic priest read prayers over the Lutheran Schelling’s 
open grave” (SVH, 150).
Alas, texts, like the dead, have no rights! This interpretation makes 
it sound like the young Schelling had made a clean break into idealism, 
but, as he grew old and weary, the old ways crept back in, making him 
more and more reactionary until he collapsed into the very forces from 
which he originally distinguished himself.
Was Schelling an idealist Lutheran or a reactionary Catholic and, 
to  a  more contemporary sensibility, what difference would it  make 
since these are the parts of Schelling that we pass over in a kind of em-
barrassed and condescending silence? As a point of fact, Schelling was 
neither a  reborn Catholic nor a  tenacious Protestant, although it  is 
clear that he maintained a deep and radical appreciation of Luther. But 
more fundamentally, such discussions imply that we have a clear idea 
of what we mean by God and religion, as if we have figured them out, 
affirmed or debunked them, and than moved on to less awkward enter-
prises. In his famous inaugural Berlin lectures, Schelling provocatively 
suggested that it makes no sense to  imagine that we can go beyond 
1 J. Laughland, Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Meta-
physics, Aldershot–Burlington 2007, [henceforth: SVH]. 
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Christianity because that would imply that we know what we are talk-
ing about. He asked: “Have you even understood Christianity? How so, 
if a philosophy must first unlock its depths?”2
This does not mean that Schelling had reverted to  the old pre-
modern game of  deploying philosophy to  marshal yet another apol-
ogy to secure the empire of institutional Christianity. Despite the long 
and often dogmatically over-reaching history of Christian metaphysics, 
philosophy, misappropriating its energies on defending and promoting 
compulsory Christianity, still had not yet unearthed its latent promise. 
Just as Luther thought that God was truly in Scripture and in cruci-
fixion but not therefore as wholly revealed but rather as hidden and 
secret, Schelling argued that God is  latent in Christianity as  its con-
cealed enigma. The secret depths of Revelation had not been revealed 
in the public event of Revelation, depths which heretofore suggest that 
Revelation is more like a mystery religion (Geheimlehre) in which a few 
adepts entered into the mystery of its resolutely non-public secret.
Moreover, religion, left to its own devices, that is, to the husk of its 
historically revealed self-understanding, cannot access itself. One 
cannot be religious merely by being “religious,” i.e., just by assenting 
to what is publically know of  religious life. The key to religion’s con-
cealed depths is what Schelling dubbed philosophical religion and it in 
turn is wholly dependent on  the event of positive philosophy. The lat-
ter is “toto caelo verschieden,” diametrically, literally, by the whole extent 
of the heavens, opposed to traditional Christian philosophy and even 
offers for the first time the “true concept of religion” (PO, 148). Religion 
has been sealed, awaiting philosophy to unleash its power. Schelling did 
not advocate a Christianity that we have had, but rather a Christianity 
to come, a prophetic Christianity made possible by a new kind of phil-
osophical thinking. Schelling was a kind of  second John the Baptist, 
with a premonition (Ahnung) of another kind of future, a future rooted 
in the ongoing κένωσις3 of a living God, “who comes out of itself through 
its own power and becomes other to itself in its unprethinkable being [der 
2 “Habt ihr das Christentum den schon erkannt? Wie, wenn eine Philosophie 
erst seine Tiefen aufschlösse?” Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42 [The Pau-
lus Nachschrift], second, expanded edition, Hrsg. M. Frank, Frankfurt am Main 1993, 
97 [henceforth: PO]. 
3 ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων 
γενόμενος: rather, he made himself nothing by taking the very nature of a servant, be-
ing made in human likeness (Philippians 2:7, NIV).
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aus eigener Macht aus sich herausgeht, ein Anderes von sich in seinem 
unvordenklichen Sein wird]” (PO, 170). Reason is beholden to the ongo-
ing revelation of being such that being always remains unthought in its 
coming to be thought. Reason must navigate the non-reason of its ground 
and the unprethinkability (Unvordenklichkeit) of existence because the 
eternal beginning (der ewige Anfang) of reason is intractably hidden!
What are we to make of unreason at the heart of reason and hidden-
ness at the ground of all possible manifestation? This is only a problem 
if we assume that philosophy belongs wholly to the provenance of light. 
Why do we cede the madness of philosophy so quickly to the mono-
lithic demands of  sobriety? That is  the stupidity—literally, the stupe-
faction— before the threat of  divine madness and withdrawal that 
characterizes the Verstandesmensch. Strikingly anticipating Nietzsche’s 
Birth of  Tragedy, Nietzsche avant la  lettre, the late Schelling speaks 
of the rational intoxication at the heart of human and divine creativity:
The mystery of true art is to be simultaneously mad and level-headed 
[wahnsinnig und besonnen], not in distinctive moments, but rather uno 
eodemque actu [altogether in  a  single act]. This is  what distinguishes 
the Apollonian inspiration from the Dionysian. The highest task of art, 
which gleams before us like a miracle, is to present in the most condi-
tioned and finite form an infinite content, which, so to speak, contests 
all form. God is in no way the mere antithesis of finitude; God is in 
no way that which can only be pleased in the infinite, but rather God 
appears precisely as the most artificial of beings [Wesen], seeking fini-
tude and not resting until He has brought everything into the most 
finite form.4
The mystery of  Christianity, far from its own historical self-un-
derstanding, is  the Apollonian radiance of  the universe, the cosmos 
as  an unfolding poem. The stupidity of  lopsidedly sober and reason-
able thought, thought as  the dull and anxiety-averse exercise of  the 
Verstandesmensch’s administration of  the knowable, is more deeply re-
vealed to be an evil urge to dominate the earth. The religious gesture, 
however, with its devotion to  the hidden ground of  the earth, finds 
its strength precisely in  the capacity to  become utterly vulnerable. 
4 Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung, two volumes, Hrsg. W. E. Ehrhardt, 
Hamburg 1992, p. 422 [henceforth: U].
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In  this sense, Schelling speaks in  a Pauline fashion of  unreasonable-
ness (Unvernünftigkeit) at the heart of reason “with respect to the ways 
of human judgment as a stupidity [Torheit]. The most audacious of the 
apostles, Paul, […] speaks of a divine stupidity, of the weakness of God, 
which is, however, as he says, stronger than all human strength. It is not 
given to everybody to grasp the deep irony in all divine ways of acting” 
(U, 420–421).
Schelling’s allusion to the audacity of Paul, who in 1 Corinthians 
calls himself a moron or fool for the Christ,5 is also a key to his appre-
ciation of Luther. Paul earlier in the same epistle claims that “the stu-
pidity of God is wiser than humans and the weakness of God is stron-
ger than humans.”6 The stupidity (Torheit, μωρός) of God, what itself 
ironically appears to  the Verstandesmensch as  merely moronic, is  pre-
cisely what demonstrates the stupidity of the stupid: it is not me that 
is stupid, but rather that which I stupidly shun that is stupid. In other 
words, the stupidity of Verstandesmensch is too stupid to know that it is 
their normal knowledge and status quo religiosity that is stupid. When 
the stupidity of the status quo is revealed, they cannot see it and instead 
castigate the threats to  the normal as  stupid. They project their own 
“stupidity” on God because they cannot see divine stupidity.
This aspect of  Pauline thought, which resonates deeply with 
Schelling and, as  we shall see, Luther, is  also the impressive focus 
of Stanislas Breton’s study of Saint Paul, The Word and the Cross, which 
speaks of  the shattering power of  the “logos of  the cross.” Breton, too, 
takes up Paul’s epistle, especially the passage at 1 Corinthians 1:18: “The 
logos of the cross is folly [μωρία] for those who are perishing, but to the 
saved, it is the power of God.”7 The language of the cross, the meon-
tic force of death rendered holy, the otherwise than being that comes 
to contest being, is, for Breton’s reading of Paul, “the death of evidence” 
that is “the true beginning […] God has chosen that which is not (μὴ 
ὄντα) to suspend (or put in parentheses) that which is (τά ὄντα).”8 The 
force of the μὴ ὂν, the otherwise than being, the logos of the cross as it 
5 “μωροὶ διὰ Χριστόν” (1 Corinthians 4:10).
6 ὅτι τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ θεοῦ σοφώτερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ 
θεοῦ ἰσχυρότερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων (1 Corinthians 1:25).
7 Ὁ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς μὲν ἀπολλυμένοις μωρία ἐστίν, τοῖς 
δὲ σῳζομένοις ἡμῖν δύναμις θεοῦ ἐστιν.
8 S. Breton, The Word and the Cross, trans. J. Porter, New York 2002, p. 8.
Jason M. Wirth98
supplants the domain of the Verstandesmensch and his and her prevail-
ing orders of  evidence, as  well as  the invidious consensus according 
to which we wage our wars of recognition, appears to those who cannot 
acknowledge this force as moronic, as the stupidity of μωρία. Nonethe-
less, the power of  radical or divine stupidity seeks to  redeem the im-
mense hold of human “stupidity.”
2. Hidden in Suffering (Absconditum in PAssionibus)
In the twenty-first thesis of  his infamous Heidelberg Disputation 
of 1518,9 Luther rejected a theology of glory for what he called, echoing 
Paul, a  theology of  the cross. This distinction is  critical to  our present 
discussion and at  the heart of  Schelling’s esteem for Luther. A  self-
congratulatory and proud theology, intoxicated by  glory, takes itself 
very seriously, but in its inebriation, gets things backward, calling “evil 
good and good evil.” Conversely, a “theology of the cross calls the thing 
what it actually is.” Dying on the cross—akin to Paul’s sojourn to Da-
mascus—sets right side up what mere inebriation (and the Verstandes-
mensch’s “stupidity”) has first set upside down.
The Schwärmer, the swarms of Verstandesmenschen and priestly bu-
reaucrats who pompously administer and promulgate God as manifest 
and known, invert and hence pervert what they think they are glorify-
ing. Citing Paul’s epistles to  the Romans as well as  the Corinthians, 
Luther chides these theologians and their ego-inebriated confidence 
in the manifest:
That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon 
the “invisible” things of God as though they were clearly “perceptible 
in those things which have actually happened.”10 This is apparent in the 
 9 All quotations from Martin Luther are from the widely available and canonical 
Concordia: The Lutheran Confessions – A Reader’s Edition of the Book of Concord, second 
edition, ed. P. T. McCain, Saint Louis 2006.
10 Luther here cites Romans 1:20: “For since the creation of  the world God’s 
invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, be-
ing understood from what has been made, so  that people are without excuse” (NIV). 
He cross references this with 1 Corinthians 1:21–25: “For since in the wisdom of God 
the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolish-
ness of what was preached to save those who believe. Jews demand signs and Greeks 
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example of  those who were “theologians” and still were called “fools” 
by the Apostle in Romans 1:22.11 (Thesis 19)
If the pseudo-theologians conflate the unmanifestable with the 
manifest, their folly restricts them from seeing their folly. Folly does 
not manifest itself as folly—that is part of its folly. To the stupid (the 
endless day of  the Verstandesmensch), it  is the benighted others who 
appear stupid and there is no way out from within this trap. Their self-
important stupidity has to be crucified in order to become a fool for 
the Christ—it is not I who live but Christ who lives in me. Luther 
continues:
He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the 
visible and manifest things of  God seen through suffering and the 
cross. The manifest and visible things of God are placed in opposition 
to the invisible, namely, his human nature, weakness, foolishness. The 
Apostle in 1 Corinthians 1:25 calls them the weakness and folly of God. 
Because men misused the knowledge of  God through works, God 
wished again to be recognized in suffering, and to condemn “wisdom 
concerning invisible things” by means of “wisdom concerning visible 
things,” so  that those who did not honor God as  manifested in  his 
works should honor him as he is hidden in his suffering (absconditum 
in  passionibus). As  the Apostle says in  1  Corinthians 1:21, “For since 
in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know him, 
God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to save 
those who believe.” Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him 
no good to recognize God in his glory and majesty, unless he recog-
nizes him in the humility and shame of the cross. Thus God destroys 
the wisdom of the wise, as Isaiah 45:15 says, “Truly, You are a God who 
hides Yourself.” (Thesis 20)
Hence Luther rails against the “completely puffed up, blinded, and 
hardened” wisdom that thinks that it “sees the invisible things of God 
look for wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolish-
ness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the 
power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than human 
wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength” (NIV).
11 “Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools” (NIV).
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in works as perceived by man” (thesis 22). Not knowing the cross and 
therefore not knowing God “hidden in suffering [absconditum in pas-
sionibus],” they pursue its opposite, becoming “puffed up” by  “good 
works” (thesis 21) and endlessly indulging in  the bottomless thirst 
of desire (thesis 22). “Just as  the love of money grows in proportion 
to the increase of the money itself, so the dropsy of the soul becomes 
thirstier the more it drinks” (thesis 22). Only the “deflation” of the cross 
and its hard won divine folly allow one to die to oneself and see that 
“works” belong to God, not oneself (thesis 21). Folly has to be extirpated 
in order to encounter divine folly:
The remedy for curing desire does not lie in satisfying it, but in extin-
guishing it. In other words, he who wishes to become wise does not 
seek wisdom by progressing toward it but becomes a fool by retrogress-
ing into seeking “folly.” Likewise he who wishes to have much power, 
honor, pleasure, satisfaction in  all things must flee rather than seek 
power, honor, pleasure, and satisfaction in all things. This is the wisdom, 
which is folly to the world. (Thesis 22)
As Marius Mjaaland articulates it  in his thoughtful reexamina-
tion of Luther, The Hidden God: this is God’s “hiddenness sub contrario” 
where “power is  hiding in  weakness, actions are hiding in  suffering, 
good is hiding in evil, etc.”12 This is the first paradoxical manifestation 
of hiddenness: in what appears to command no glory, beyond all vain-
glory, power, and self-aggrandizement, one dis-covers the hidden glory 
of God.
In dis-covering the hidden glory of God, concealed in the inglori-
ous and the ignominious, however, it does not follow that God is there-
fore revealed and is no longer deus absconditus. There is the hiddenness 
of the cross—a location where God can be found as absconded—but 
there is also an absolute and majestic hiddenness, which we can find 
powerfully in works like De servo arbitrio (1525). Opposed to the delu-
sion that our will is free, there is the absolute sovereignty of the divine 
will, “whose ways and reasons are unsearchable” (HG, 68). Luther is clear 
about this as he attempts to avoid obscurantism while simultaneously 
distancing himself from Erasmus. This is  the “most profound secret 
12 M. T.  Mjaaland, The Hidden God: Luther, Philosophy, and Political Theology, 
Bloomington–Indianapolis 2016, p. 42 [henceforth: HG]. 
Schelling and Luther 101
of majesty, that is, “God hidden in majesty” (section 64). In brings them 
to what Schelling in the first draft of Die Weltalter called das Verstum-
men der Wissenschaft, the growing silent of science.13 Or as Luther mem-
orably frames it: “It is here the hand is to be laid upon the mouth, it is 
here we are to reverence what lies hidden, to adore the secret counsels 
of the divine Majesty, and to exclaim with Paul, ‘Who are you […] that 
would contend with God?’ (Romans 9:20)” (section 23).
Scriptures do not exhaust the hiddenness of God; in revealing God 
they also reveal the limit of all possible revelation. As Luther infamous-
ly proclaims: “God, and the Scripture of God, are two things; no less 
so than God, and the Creature of God” (section 3). Luther critically and 
consequentially distinguished between “God preached and God hidden: 
that is, between the word of God and God Himself. God does many 
things which He  does not make known unto us  in His word” (sec-
tion 64). This is Paul’s “wisdom hidden in a mystery” (sections 27, 158).
The hidden God, deus absconditus, hides in  the radical conversion 
of suffering as well as in the imponderable mystery of God’s majesty. 
Yet, despite such majestic concealment, it remains no less hidden. It is 
revealed as hidden, only to become the majestic power of the absolutely 
hidden. Indeed, as Mjaaland contends, “the deus absconditus is hidden 
within yet beyond both the hiddenness revealed in the crucifixion and 
the hiddenness of majesty and sovereignty itself ” (HG, 106).
Deus absconditus, hidden in  the revelation of  its majestic hidden-
ness, is not so much a conclusion or a demonstration but rather Bret-
on’s “death of evidence” that is “the true beginning.” It is at the heart 
of all images but in itself it has no possible image and emerges beyond 
image and in  the destruction of  those who drunkenly attach them-
selves to images. Mjaaland: “The notion of ‘deus absconditus’ is radically 
destructive, indeed, iconoclastic, when it  comes to  myths and images 
of God” (HG, 89). As such, it remains prior to all revelation, “older than 
beings and prior to their existence” (HG, 133), much like Schelling who 
spoke of the ground of nature as the “abyss of the past” and an author 
13 “I would like, if it were not too immodest, to take this opportunity to say what 
I have so often felt… namely, how much closer I am than most people could conceive 
to that growing silent of science [Verstummen der Wissenschaft] which must necessarily 
emerge if we know how infinitely personal everything is, that it  is impossible really 
to know anything.” Die Weltalter in den Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813 (Nachlaßband), 
Hrsg. M. Schröter, Munich 1946, p. 103. 
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who wrote in undecipherable hieroglyphics (I/5, 246). The deus abscon-
ditus is a kind of irreducible remainder, that, as such, remains “the in-
definable condition for phenomenality by resisting the grasp of human 
reason” (HG, 131). Schelling resonated with this Lutheran sensibility—
crucifixion as the price of resurrection into the wisdom of folly—as the 
price of admission for doing philosophy, which first demands wrench-
ing it away from the clutches of the Verstandesmensch. In the Erlanger 
Vorlesungen (1820–21),14 Schelling counsels that those who would phi-
losophize, those “who want to place themselves at the beginning point 
of a truly free philosophy, must abandon even God” (IPU, 18). One does 
not enter the space of philosophy just by signing up for a college course. 
It is exclusively for those who “had once left everything and who were 
themselves left by everything” and who, like Socrates contemplating his 
demise in the Phaedo, “saw themselves alone with the infinite: a great 
step which Plato compared to death” (IPU, 18–19). Hence:
What Dante had written on the gate of the Inferno could also in an-
other sense be  the entrance into Philosophy: ‘Abandon hope all you 
who enter here.’ The one who wants truly to  philosophize must let 
go of all hope, all desire, all Sehnsucht. They must want nothing, know 
nothing, feel themselves bare and poor. They must give up everything 
in order to gain everything. (IPU, 19)
This was Schelling’s account of  the spiritual crucifixion in  order 
to enter the gate of philosophical study.
3. After Luther
Schelling resisted the inebriated arrogance of orthodoxy and did not 
associate Christianity with a  doctrine (Lehre), but rather considered 
it a matter for thought (eine Sache) (SW II/4, 228).15 Schelling’s lectures 
14 F.W.J. Schelling, Initia Philosophiæ Universæ (1820–21), Hrsg. H.  Fuhrmans, 
Bonn 1969 [henceforth: IPU]. 
15 Citations follow the standard pagination, which adheres to  the original edi-
tion established after Schelling’s death by his son, Karl. It lists the division, followed 
by the volume, followed by the page number. Hence (I/1, 1) would read, division one, 
volume one, page one. This pagination is  preserved in  Manfred Schröter’s critical 
reorganization of  this material. Schellings Sämtliche Werke, Hrsg. K.  F. A.  Schelling, 
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on mythology and revelation explicitly did not seek to “establish any 
actual doctrine or any kind of speculative dogmatism for we will not 
in  any way be  dogmatic” (II/4, 30). At  issue is  not any institution’s 
promulgation of any particular doctrine of revelation. “The matter for 
thought [Sache] of revelation is older than any dogma and we will sim-
ply occupy ourselves with the matter for thought and not with any 
of the various ways it has been subjectively conceived” (SW II/4, 30).
This did not mean that Schelling went to war against established 
or “understood” religion—he always remains respectful. This is none-
theless a  radical genealogical retrieval of  the very possibility and po-
tency of  religion. Schelling associated the historically domineering 
(universalizing by way of the sword) Catholic Church with Peter, and 
just as Peter wept tears of remorse for betraying Christ, one day the 
Catholic Church will do likewise. Although the Catholic Church pos-
sesses the mystery, they did not find it  all that mysterious and were 
given to “abiding and constant domination.”19 Indeed, “the pope is the 
true antichrist” (PO, 318) and the Petrine Church is “in the city” (U, 708), 
that is, is  the Church of  empire. Peter, the rock upon which Chris-
tian empire was built, had the evidence of the Christ, but he did not 
have the madness and folly of the hidden ground of the Christ. The 
husk of Christianity spread everywhere, but to find its enigmatic and 
majestic seed, one would have to  leave the official city of  manifest 
Christianity and, like the mystics and spiritual rebels, attempt to break 
through the existence of Christianity to the dark ground of Christian-
ity. In a sense, Catholicism needed the death of God to be reborn into 
the folly of a radical Catholicism, grounded in the mystery of the hid-
den God.
If Peter is the official Church (A1) and the hold of the past and the 
tyranny of its historical evidence and forms, then the Pauline Church—
Luther’s Church—is the hidden Church (A2) (II/4, 707), “external to the 
city [in der Vostadt]” (U, 708). Just as Dionysus in the mystery religions 
brought the real back to its hidden soul (PO, 239), the Pauline retrieval 
of the esoteric dimension is the revelation of the present as grounded 
not in any particular thing or event, but abysmally rooted in eternal-
ly hidden depths. Not only does Paul challenge the Petrine Church, 
he foreshadows the power of the Protestant revolt. “In Paul lives the 
Stuttgart–Augsburg 1856–1861; Schellings Werke: Nach der Originalausgabe in neuer Anor-
dnung, Hrsg. M. Schröter, Munich 1927.
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dialectical, limber, scientific, confrontational principle” (PO, 317). It  is, 
however, only a “transitional form” (PO, 320), although “Paul’s lighten-
ing strikes of genius […] liberated the Church from a blind unity” (PO, 
322) and revealed the ideal within the real. There is no getting around 
Luther—he was the Pauline Rubicon.
Still, for Schelling, he is not the final word because in revealing the 
mystery of the ground, he had not yet unleashed its creativity. Yes, the 
deus absconditus destroys all images in an absolute iconoclasm, but it is 
also the dark heart of the ceaseless creativity of the divine and human 
imagination.
If Schelling were to “build a Church in our time,” he “would con-
secrate it to Saint John the Evangelist. But sooner or later there will 
be a Church in which the three above named apostles are united; this 
Church will then be  the true pantheon of Christian Church history” 
(U, 708)! The Church to come is the Church not merely in the future 
but of the future, that is, a church that liberates time and activates the 
creativity of the future, a church of the whole of time (the infinite depth 
of the past, the mystery of the present, and the unprethinkable future); 
in a word, philosophical religion espouses the Church of the A3. John 
is  the “apostle of the future” (PO, 317): “One is not merely an apostle 
in the time in which one lives” and John was “actually not the apostle 
for his time.” Paul would first have to come, but the “Lord loved” John, 
“that is, in him he knew himself ” (U, 703). The Johanine Church, the 
church for everyone and everything—for all things human and for the 
mysterious creativity of the earth itself—is the “being everything in ev-
erything of God” (U, 708–709), a  “theism that contains within itself 
the entire economy of God” (U, 709). This religion not only does not 
exclude anything, but it includes everything as alive, where “everything 
has its inner process for itself ” (U, 710). This is religion beyond Petrine 
empire (the imposition of external forms of religion) and Pauline revolt 
(the recovery of the esoteric soul of religion). This is the mysterious and 
creative life of “a revealed God, not an abstract idol” (PO, 324).
Schelling and Luther? Both harbor the latency of the enigma of the 
past that is always still to come and to create anew.
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